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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Netherlands has had a longstanding reputation for being one of the most tolerant 
countries in the world. Within the span of a single decade, however, that reputation was lost. 
The first of a series of events that underlies this change occurred in 2002 when Pim Fortuyn 
stepped onto the political scene. Crime, immigration and failing integration policies had 
become sources of discontent and worry for many Dutch citizens, especially those living in 
the poorer urbanized areas. A few members of the political establishment, notably politician 
Frits Bolkestein and publicist Paul Scheffer, tried to address the problems of multiculturalism. 
Their critique, however, was dismissed as being racist. “To see massive immigration as a 
problem […]”, Ian Buruma comments on the episode, “was worse than bad taste; it was like 
questioning the European ideal or racial equality” (2006: 53). Fortuyn, mediagenic, 
flamboyant, openly homosexual and a political outsider, was the man who broke open the 
discussion and became a possible candidate for the office of prime minister almost over 
night. Just nine days before the parliamentary elections Fortuyn’s party Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF) was taking part in for the first time, Fortuyn was shot and killed by an animal rights 
activist. The scenes at his funeral procession were as uncharacteristic of Dutch culture as the 
political murder that inspired them. Fortuyn posthumously received 1.1 million votes. LPF 
became the second biggest parliamentary party with 26 out of 150 seats and was one of the 
three parties to enter into coalition government.  
Without its leader, LPF quickly lost its electoral support, but the issues Fortuyn had 
addressed remained salient. Some of Fortuyn’s positions were partly adopted by established 
parties, such as People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), but electoral potential 
remained. A second murder, one and a half years after Fortuyn’s violent death, revived the 
anxieties of the Dutch. Director Theo van Gogh, who was critical of Islam and admired 
Fortuyn and atheist activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, was shot by Muslim extremist Mohammed 
Bouyeri on a street in Amsterdam. Using a small knife, Bouyeri pinned a letter addressed to 
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Hirsi Ali to Van Gogh’s chest. The hours and days after the murder were tense. Dutch media 
added to the tension by blowing the smallest disturbance up out of proportion (Buruma 2006: 
8). 
It was Geert Wilders who seized upon the electoral potential of immigration critique, the topic 
that other parties still took care to avoid. In 2004, the year Van Gogh was murdered, Wilders 
broke with the VVD, the party he had been an MP for for six years, over his controversial 
views on Islam. In the years since, his party has had considerable electoral success, but has 
also been criticized for its intolerant attitudes towards Muslims and, more recently, East-
European immigrants. An opinion piece written by Wilders and published in de Volkskrant in 
2007, in which Wilders called the Koran a “fascist book”, led a number of people and 
associations to file charges against him. Wilders was tried in for inciting hatred and 
discrimination against Muslims. His acquittal in 2011 was, according to the foreign press, the 
final blow to Dutch tolerance (De Jong 2011).  
Both Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders seemed able to tap into some difficult to grasp quality of 
the Dutch electorate. Buruma offers two explanations for Dutch voters’ behavior. The first has 
its context in a wider trend in continental Europe, where processes of globalization, 
Europeanization and the hegemony of multi-national corporations have made it unclear to 
people where decision making takes place. This left people feeling underrepresented. The 
second explanation lies in the style of Dutch politics. The Dutch poldermodel has 
successfully accommodated multiple parties by means of consensus and compromise, but, 
because of its intrinsic qualities, got “stuck in the rut of a self-perpetuating elite, shuffling jobs 
back and forth between the members of the club” (2006: 50-51). The Dutch voter was 
confused and frustrated with politics. In the debate, it is often claimed that there is a ‘gap’ 
between the electorate and politians. 
The events in the Netherlands and the explanations that Buruma offers tie in with a more 
general trend. What seems to be going is that political socialization processes are failing. 
When political socialization is successful, citizens are become aware of civic society and feel 
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a duty to engage in it. When they fail, people feel disconnected from society and the state. 
Buruma’s analysis points to two opposing perspectives in the political socialization debate. 
From one point of view, it is the citizen whose interest in politics and in being politically and 
civically engaged is decreasing. Political apathy grows and citizens become disaffected 
(Loader 2007: 1). Opposite the disaffected citizen perspective is the cultural displacement 
point of view. According to this approach, citizens’ levels of political interest and their 
willingness to be engaged is no less than previous generations, rather it seems that 
traditional political activity is no longer able to address contemporary concerns (Loader 2007: 
1-2).  
There have been few attempts to examine political tolerance in the Netherlands in any 
systematic way. From a normative standpoint, this is rather remarkable. Political tolerance is 
a civic virtue widely recognized to be essential for well-functioning democracy, particularly in 
a pluralistic country like the Netherlands. Decreasing levels of political tolerance have 
potentially destabilizing effects. Decreasing tolerance in the broader perspective of political 
socialization is, however, merely a symptom of failure. This study aspires to contribute to the 
political socialization debate. It looks at political tolerance amongst the Dutch and compares 
traditional associational activity with online activity that potentially enhances engagement 
and, therewith, tolerance. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the extent of citizen disaffection by comparing 
traditional forms of civic engagement, i.e. associational activity, with newer forms of 
participation. In doing so, the study draws on the political socialization and political tolerance 
literature. The theoretical framework is closely associated with social capital theory. Besides 
its most common use as a label for social networks and norms, social capital also refers to a 
perspective on democracy. In this sense, social capital is a causal theory with a focus on the 
“socialization of individuals into cooperative behavior” (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999: 3).  
 
2.1 Associations 
Associations have a central role in social capital conceptions of democracy. Mark E. Warren 
distinguishes three ways in which associations produce potentially democratizing effects: 
public sphere effects, institutional effects and developmental effects. Firstly, public sphere 
effects occur when associations “contribute to the formation of public opinion and public 
judgment”, thus providing political autonomy (Warren 2001: 61). Secondly, institutional 
effects are “the effects associations have on the institutions through which collective 
decisions are made and collective actions are organized” (Warren 2001: 82). Thirdly, and 
most relevant for the present study, are developmental effects on individuals: “[a]ssociations 
may contribute to forming, enhancing, and supporting the capacities of democratic citizens” 
(Warren 2011: 61). Associations promote citizens’ efficacy, enhance their political and critical 
skills and cultivate civic virtues, amongst which are trust and tolerance (Warren 2001: 70-75).   
 
The developmental effects Warren identifies are the result of the political socialization 
processes that takes place within associations. It is here that citizens acquire their political 
orientations and behaviors, including political tolerance orientations (Cigler and Joslyn 2002: 
9). By participating in voluntary groups and associations, the argument runs, citizens gain 
experience with views and interests of other citizens that may differ from their own (Cigler 
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and Joslyn 2002: 7). Associations with horizontal internal structures and relatively egalitarian 
structures are in a way ‘little democracies’ in themselves (Cigler and Joslyn 2002: 8). So not 
only do people learn about other people’s perspectives and how to deal with them on a 
personal level, they are also exposed to more formal rules of collective decision making, and 
thus get acquainted with the democratic proceedings of the larger polity.  
 
This is not to say that associational activity only produces democratic effects. Indeed, there is 
also a ‘dark side’ to associational activity which may manifest itself in particular in 
hierarchical, homogenous groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan (Cigler and Joslyn 2002: 9). 
Robert Putnam, in his influential book Bowling Alone, distinguishes between bonding social 
capital and bridging social capital (2000: 22-23). Forms of bonding social capital, he explains, 
are “inward looking and tend to reinforce inclusive identities and homogeneous groups” 
(Putnam 2000: 22). They forge strong in-group bonds, but may, consequently, also create 
“strong out-group antagonism” and thus increase intolerance (2000: 23). Forms of bridging 
social capital, however, “are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social 
cleavages” (2000: 22). Thus, different kinds of groups produce different effects; some 
enhance democratic effects, others do just the opposite.  
 
2.2 Political tolerance 
Political tolerance is generally seen as a major prerequisite for a well functioning democracy 
(Gibson 2006:  21-23; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979: 781). The concept implies “a 
willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes” (Gibson 
and Bingham 1982: 604). In the political sphere, where different groups compete for 
influence and power, this means that one refrains from oppressing their political enemies 
(Gibson 2006: 22). Different studies have found that levels of intolerance are quite high, even 
in established democracies (see for example Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). As long as 
the targets of intolerance are quite diverse, there is no real danger to civil liberties or 
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democracy. If, however, attitudes are focused and mobilized, then intolerance might pose a 
threat to the functioning of democracy (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979: 793). The Dutch 
case reminds us that circumstances can change quite rapidly and that it is, therefore, both 
important and urgent to gain an ever deeper understanding of political tolerance.  
Cigler and Joslyn test the general hypothesis that participation in groups leads to higher 
levels of political tolerance. They expect there to be a positive relationship between the 
number of associations that individuals are involved in on the one hand and political 
tolerance on the other. Similarly, Cigler and Joslyn anticipate a positive relation between 
“memberships of an overlapping, yet diverse set of groups” and political tolerance (2002:9). 
Cigler and Joslyn find that group membership, regardless of the nature or number of groups, 
is a predictor of political tolerance. Moreover, they report that additional memberships 
correlate with greater levels of tolerance (2002: 15). The expectation that group type would 
have an effect on political tolerance was not borne out, or at least not entirely. The results 
showed that “memberships in veterans and farm groups, churches, unions and Greek 
organizations were all associated with lower levels of tolerance” (Cigler and Joslyn 2002: 20). 
These types of organizations may fit into the category of bonding social capital. Memberships 
of literary, professional, political and cultural groups, in contrast, have a positive effect on 
tolerance. Both effects are nowhere near as large as group membership alone, however 
(Cigler and Joslyn 2002: 20). This leads Cigler and Joslyn to conclude that the isolated 
citizen is the one that is least likely to be politically tolerant. 
 
2.3 Online activity and civic engagement 
One possible critique on Cigler and Joslyn’s study on political tolerance is their focus on 
traditional associations. One reason why such an approach is inadequate is that traditional 
associations – churches, unions and political parties in particular – are less and less relevant. 
As discussed above, traditional associations have, for various reasons, seen their 
membership numbers decrease in the past half century (Putnam 2000). Instead, there are 
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clues that membership has shifted to other types of associations and to the digital sphere. 
Indeed, Quan-Haase et al. suggest that a focus on traditional associational activity may lead 
to new forms of communication and participation being overlooked (2008: 3). This critique 
echoes the cultural displacement point of view on civic engagement, in which 
“deinstitutionalized forms of political engagement (…) are enacted within networks and 
spaces characterized by loose social ties and informal social structures” (Loader 2007: 3). 
The early debate about the effects worldwide connectedness through the internet would have 
on citizens and civil society ran between two opposing camps: the utopians (or e-topians) 
and the dystopians. The utopians emphasized the opportunities of the new technology. 
According to them, the internet would allow individuals to increase and deepen their social 
contacts (De Haan 2008: 365). The internet has no closing hours and no geographical limits. 
People can be online 24/7 if they choose to, and interact with whomever they choose to 
through an ever diversifying and ever increasing number of media channels. The internet 
would also eliminate gender, ethnic and socioeconomic inequalities (De Haan 2008: 365). As 
such, the utopians posited, the internet had a huge potential for social inclusion, participation 
and integration. It could develop into a complete alternative to offline citizenship (Warschauer 
in Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal 2008: 1). 
The list of arguments brought to the table by the dystopians is equally extensive. Dystopian 
feared that the internet would not contribute to social cohesion, but, instead, would cause 
social isolation (De Haan 2008: 365; Quan-Haase et al 2008: 3). Rather than go out into the 
real world and meet others, dystopians argued, people would spend more time staying at 
home, surfing the web. Online contacts, they believed, would not have the same socially 
integrating quality as working and recreating in the real world. In addition, the internet would 
not eliminate inequalities, but help shape new ones through differences in access to and 
(ability to) use the new technology, creating a ‘digital divide’ (Loader 2007: 4). With regard to 
online participation, the cyber-pessimists expected the Internet to reflect “politics as usual” 
(Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal 2008: 49). This entails that those who were already 
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participating in the real world would continue their participation online, whereas those not 
participating in the real world would not start doing so online (Vromen 2007: 98). 
Perhaps unsurprising, neither of the two polar opposites has become a reality today. As 
scholarship has caught up with developments in the real world, results of research on online 
political participation have been mixed. Some studies support elements of the dystopian 
account of events, other research corroborates parts of the utopian account. For example, 
the dystopian expectation that access to and usage of the internet would be unequal, has, 
thus far, been borne out. Generally speaking, internet access and usage remains limited to 
well-educated people with high incomes. A recent study found that 73 percent of households 
in the 27 countries of the European Union have access to the internet (Seybert 2011). There 
are considerable differences between countries, with the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Denmark and Sweden scoring over 90 percent and Bulgaria, Romania and Greece lagging 
behind with 50 percent or less (Seybert 2011). More interesting are the statistics on who 
actually uses the internet regularly. Seybert reports that age, country and education are the 
most significant sources of inequality (2011). Although differences remain, there is, however, 
also a silver lining. DiMaggio and Celeste report that socioeconomic features of adopters of 
internet technology “have become less distinctive over time” (2004: 6). This pertains 
especially to the gender divide, which “has disappeared with respect to access to the Web, 
and appears to be rapidly diminishing with respect to patterns of productive use as well” 
(DiMaggio and Celeste 2004: 40).  
Today, as the internet has become a stable presence in the daily lives of millions of people in 
the United States and Europe, increasing support is found for a third possible effect of the 
internet on civic engagement. Rather than substitute or enhance, the internet supplements 
social capital. For example, Quan-Haase et al. have looked the relation between online and 
offline interactions, people’s sense of community and levels of civic engagement. They 
conclude that the internet “facilitates social contact that supplements face-to-face and 
telephone contact” (2008: 29). Also, they found that those who are active offline find 
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additional ways of doing so online. Thus, rather than decrease or increase social capital, the 
internet is “quietly fostering the changing composition of social capital” (Quan-Haase et al. 
2008: 30).  
DiMaggio and Celeste claim that individuals deal with new technologies like the internet in 
different ways. They distinguish between ‘drop outs’ and ‘adopters’. Some people will try the 
technology, but decide it is not for them. Others may be more enthusiastic or skilled and will 
continue using the technology after they first started using it. Not every ‘adopter’ uses the 
technology in the same way, however. Some internet users may go online every day and 
engage in a wide range of different activities, while others use it just to read their e-mails 
once a week. Thus, internet users have varying ‘technological careers’ in which it does not 
only matter if individuals use a certain technology, but what patterns their usage follow 
subsequently (2004: 3). 
On the basis of the theory that the internet supplements, rather than increases or decreases, 
offline activity in terms of democratic effects, it is hypothesized that associational activity and 
online activity reinforce one another. In other words, it is expected that the two have an 
interaction effect. The next sections describes how the study was set up in order to test this 
hypothesis. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Case selection 
A large proportion of the Dutch population is well-versed with internet usage. In a cross-
European study the Dutch ranked second (after Sweden) for frequency of internet use. 
Ninety per cent of the Dutch population went online at least once a week, while nearly eighty 
percent did so almost every day. Only seven per cent of the population had never used the 
internet (Seybert 2011).  As far as user skills are concerned, the Dutch score above the 
European average (Van Deursen and Van Dijk 2001: 27). The decline of associations that 
Putnam and others have claimed is so evident and consequential in the United States of 
America has also been studied in the Netherlands. Although memberships of traditional 
associations such as churches, political parties and unions have decreased sharply in since 
the 1950s, social capital levels have not. Bekkers and De Graaf explain that it is not so much 
the scope of social capital, but the base of social capital that has changed in the Netherlands 
(2002: 338). New, secular organizations, chiefly in the areas of environmental protection, 
ethical issues, cultural expression and sports, were founded and have in part taken the place 
of traditional associations (Bekkers and De Graaf 2002: 339). It is this combination of widely 
dispersed internet usage and the prevalence of associations that makes The Netherlands in 
particular such a relevant case for testing the hypothesis that online activity supplements 
offline participation. 
3.2 Survey design 
An online survey was distributed via the author’s personal network. Respondents were 
recruited via e-mail and social networking websites such as Facebook. Participants were 
asked to share the link to the survey with the people in their own networks, thus recruiting 
more respondents. Although snowball sampling is subject to bias, this sampling technique 
was deemed the most effective strategy for acquiring a decent sized sample. In a time span 
of three weeks, 804 respondents filled out the questionnaire. 
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The survey consisted of a total of 24 questions, 14 of which are used in the present paper. It 
included questions for other research projects as well, with all projects having political 
tolerance as their dependent variable. Care was taken to exclude any questions that might 
influence responses to the questions about political tolerance. A total of 38 respondents was 
excluded from the sample due to non-response. This includes three respondents who 
indicated that there was no group they could think of that they did not like. The total sample, 
then, consisted of 766 respondents. 
3.3 Variables  
3.3.1 Political tolerance 
For the dependent variable, political tolerance, a content controlled measure was included. 
The question read: ‘Some people believe that certain groups pose a threat to social order. 
Which of the following groups would you designate as your least liked group?’ Respondents 
were then presented with four preselected groups: neo-Nazis, East European immigrants, 
Muslim fundamentalists, and homosexuals. In addition, the respondents were given the 
option to enter their own least liked group. 
 
The content controlled measure for political tolerance, introduced by Sullivan, Piereson and 
Marcus, ensures that respondents answer the tolerance questions with their least liked group 
in mind. It does not matter for the purposes of tolerance research whether a respondent’s 
least liked group is Muslim fundamentalists, people from the province of Noord-Brabant or 
supporters of the Freedom Party. Early empirical research on political tolerance, notably 
Samuel A. Stouffer’s seminal work Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties, offered the 
respondents with a list of preselected groups, most of a leftist orientation (1955). Evidently, 
the mention of Communists and Socialists during the heydays of the Cold War and 
McCarthyism would trigger intolerant responses. Studies conducted in subsequent decades 
using the same preselected groups as Stouffer logically found that levels of political 
intolerance declined as Cold War hostilities subsided (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1979: 
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781). However, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus noted that these results confused intolerance 
for specific groups for intolerance in general. They proposed giving respondents the 
opportunity to select a group other than the ones on the preselected list, if their least liked 
group was not on there. In addition, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus took care to ensure that 
the list would include groups representing various positions on the left-right and progressive-
conservative dimensions, and not just those on the political left (1979: 785). Their findings 
opposed Stouffer’s: it was not so much that intolerance levels had decreased, but that the 
focus of intolerance had changed (1979: 789).  
 
The list of preselected groups in the present study was relatively short. The four groups that 
were included were chosen on the basis of two criteria: the expectation that it might be the 
least liked group for a large percentage of respondents and the potential to make 
respondents think about their own least liked group, should they feel none of the preselected 
options accorded with their own attitudes. Muslim fundamentalists, for example, were 
included because they are the source of much anxiety in the Western world. But the word 
‘fundamentalists’ might also trigger respondents into offering ‘religious extremists’ because 
they feel that label is the more appropriate for the group they find most objectionable. 
 
Next, respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought people belonging to their 
least liked group should be allowed to participate in each of the following six activities: teach 
their children, seek office, found a political party, have airtime on public broadcasting, hold a 
rally or demonstration and be put under surveillance. Respondents had to answer either ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ to each of the items, resulting in a six-point index with the most intolerant respondents 
scoring 0 and the most tolerant scoring 6. The way the questions are phrased is commonly 
accepted in the political tolerance literature, with the footnote that they were adjusted to fit 
the Dutch context. For example, in American political tolerance research respondents are 
commonly asked if they think their least liked group should be subjected to phone taps. The 
placement of phone taps, however, is a far less salient issue in the Netherlands than it is in 
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the United States. Identifying and listing societal groups on the basis of their religion or origin 
for the purpose of surveilling them, however, is far more controversial, as it harks back to 
Holocaust fears and guilt. Including a question on phone taps is, therefore, less likely to elicit 
intolerant responses from Dutch respondents than a question on surveillance measures.  
 
3.3.2 Civic engagement 
Respondents were then asked to indicate which type of associations and organizations they 
were members of. The question read: ‘Of which of the following types of associations and 
organizations are you a member?’ A list of twenty types of traditional associations and 
organizations was offered, ranging from general categories such as political parties and 
sports associations to typically Dutch clubs like carnival associations and broadcasting 
associations. There was no limit to the number of association types respondent could select. 
Respondents were also given the possibility to add types of organizations of which they were 
a member, but which they felt were not provided for in the list.  
 
DiMaggio and Celeste have argued that individuals may have different technological careers 
(2004). What matters is not just that individuals adopt a certain technology, but also the 
patterns of their use once they have successfully adopted the technology. Not every type of 
online activity is likely to enhance social capital, just like not every offline activity is likely to 
do so. The same holds for the frequency with which individuals engage in particular online 
activities. Online activity, then, was measured with the question ‘How often do you engage in 
each of the following online activities?’ The questionnaire included eight different online 
activities which were selected on the basis of their logical potential to enhance civic 
engagement. For example, ‘looking for information’ and ‘social networking’ were included, but 
one-dimensional communication types such as surfing the web or online shopping were not. 
Respondents had to choose a frequency from five categories: practically every day, once or 
twice a week, once or twice a month, rarely or never, and don’t know. For analytical 
purposes, it is assumed that respondents who cannot tell how often they, for example, video 
16 
chat or engage in crowd sourcing either do not know what the term entails, or do not engage 
in the particular activity too often. In either case, these responses best fit the ‘rarely or never’-
category. 
 
3.3.3 Control variables 
For control variables, the survey included the variables gender, age, level of education and 
income. The original Dutch survey, and English translation and coding information are 
included in the appendices.  
 
3.4 Analysis  
In order to test if there is an interaction effect between online and offline activity, an 
interaction term was introduced. The interaction term multiplies the associational activity and 
online activity variables. The ordinary least squares method is then used to fit the model to 
the dependent variable, the seven-point political tolerance index. For each of the individual 
questions that make up the political tolerance index, logistic regression analysis is used to 
estimate the fit of the model to the data.  
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Sample  
The sample consists of 766 respondents. Women are slightly overrepresented at 58.7 per 
cent of the sample. The average age of respondents is 34 years. 56.4 per cent of the 
respondents is between 20 and 30 years old. Over half of the respondents (51.7 per cent) 
report an income below minimum wage. Thus, the average respondent is female, 34 years of 
age, and earns less than 1450 euros a month. The sample can therefore not be considered 
representative of the Dutch population at large.  
 
4.2 Least Liked Group 
Most respondents selected neo-Nazi’s as their least liked group. Muslim Fundamentalists 
came in second. Homosexuals and East-European immigrants were selected by 0.3 and 1.7 
percent of the sample respectively. 8.6 per cent of the respondents stated another group to 
be their least liked group. Three respondents claimed there was no group that they disliked. 
Their responses were excluded from the sample.  
 
4.3 Political tolerance 
The mean score on the political tolerance index was 3.41, just above the mathematical mean 
of the seven point index that was coded zero to six. The results of the regression analysis are 
reported in table 1. Age (b = -0.021, p < 0.005) and education (b = 0.322, p < 0.005) are the 
only variables in the model that are significant predictors of political tolerance. The directions 
of the correlations correspond to the general consensus in the literature; the younger and the 
more highly educated, the more tolerant. The other control variables, income and gender, do 
not come out as significant in the analysis. The interaction term, although being positively 
correlated to political tolerance, is not significant. Table 1 also reports the regression 
coefficients and standard errors for each of the items that together make up the political 
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tolerance index. Here too, the key variables online activity and associational activity are not 
significant. The same holds, across all items, for the interaction term. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
The hypothesis that online and offline activity reinforce one another is not supported by the 
data. The interaction term that was included into the regression model, although positive and 
thus having the correct direction, was not significant. This means that it cannot be concluded 
that people who are active both online and offline are more likely to be politically tolerant.  
Online activity, then, does not seem to supplement associational activity in terms of its 
potential to enhance political tolerance in the sample used here.  
 
This, however, is no reason to dismiss the hypothesis. There are several explanations for the 
results of this study being inconclusive. The first explanation pertains to the sample and data 
collection method. Using snowball sampling has resulted in a non-representative sample. As 
briefly mentioned in the results section, women, 18 to 25 year-olds, the higher educated and 
lower incomes are overrepresented. In addition, by distributing the survey via e-mail and 
social networks, the study in all likelihood attracted respondents who had at least some 
measure of experience with the internet and precisely those online activities that the study is 
interested in, thus distorting the results.   
 
A second explanation may be found in the measurement of the dependent variable, political 
tolerance. An index of six items that are commonly used in political tolerance studies was 
constructed. Some items were adapted to fit the Dutch context. The likelihood ratios 
(Nagelkerke R²) of the Airtime and Surveillance variables are particularly low. These two of 
the items in the index should, therefore, be revised or excluded entirely.  
 
A third explanation for the inconclusive results of this study may be what is referred to as the 
‘dark side’ of associations. Cigler and Joslyn have found such an effect in their study on the 
extensiveness of group membership. They identified a number of different organization 
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types, notably unions, farm associations, Greek organizations and church groups, as being 
particularly negatively correlated to tolerance attitudes. Similarly, a number of the types of 
memberships in the present study may contribute negatively to the overall index of political 
tolerance. Yet Cigler and Joslyn also found that the negative effects of a subset of their list of 
organizations was “offset by the positive contributions to tolerance orientations of a single 
membership” (2002: 15). So, even if a number of organization types listed in the present 
study produces negatives effects, associational activity as an additive index should still be 
positively correlated with the dependent variable. It seems, then, that the dark side of 
associational activity is a possible, but unlikely explanation for the results of this study.  
 
A final explanation is related to the operationalization of the online activity variable. DiMaggio 
and Celeste have suggested that individuals have different technological careers, that is, 
different patterns of internet usage. The survey, therefore, inquired not only what types of 
online activities respondents engaged in, but also the frequency with which they did so. If 
online activities produce democratic effects in ways similar to and reinforcing offline 
associational activity, then online activity should be positively related to political tolerance 
attitudes. Although the present study did not corroborate this expectation, the argument 
remains viable.  
 
A factor analysis of the observed data suggests that the eight online activity items represent 
three general dimensions. Intuitively, the items that the factor analysis groups together make 
sense. The factor analysis sorts online networking, contributing to forum discussions, 
searching for information, watching and sharing photos and videos and keeping up with news 
and current affairs into one dimension. Another dimension consists of crowd sourcing and 
crowd funding. The factor analysis sets e-mailing apart as a final dimension. One way to 
interpret the activities grouped together into distinctive dimensions is in terms of levels of 
use. A ‘minimal’ user may only go online to read and send e-mails from and to colleagues 
and distant relatives. This type of use is unlikely to increase social capital and political 
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tolerance. The ‘intermediate’ user goes online for purposes that flow from their offline lives; 
their online social network resembles their offline social network and they may read the paper 
and watch television news alongside looking for information and news online. A third 
category consists of ‘maximum’ users. Maximum users are those individuals who make use 
of the internet’s new possibilities and applications; those purposes that do not have an offline 
equivalent, or only an inferior alternative. Examples are crowd sourcing and crowd funding. It 
is this class of individuals who may be the foremost to see the internet as a ‘universe’ in its 
own right. It is also for this group of users that increased social capital and political tolerance 
through online activity alone become likely.  
 
An exploratory regression analysis was run to follow up on this presumption and validate the 
factor loadings. Recoding the social activity variable along the lines of these three categories 
and including it into the regression model does not, however, yield a significantly better fit. 
Nevertheless, expanding on and deepening the conceptualization and operationalization 
DiMaggio and Celeste’s model of technological careers seems like a promising venture for 
future research. Creating a more sophisticated model will help increase the validity of 
measurements and enhance our understanding of online activity and its possible 
consequences for social capital and political tolerance.  
 
The Netherlands as a nation were for a long time known for their tolerance. The Dutch wore 
this reputational ‘gold star’ with a certain smugness. In the past fifteen to twenty years, 
however, there has been little to be smug about. Tolerance is no longer one of The 
Netherlands’ defining traits and the political debate is increasingly polarized. When intolerant 
sentiments are mobilized, the underpinnings of democracy are threatened. Thus, it remains 
important to study political tolerance, not just to establish how much intolerance there is and 
at which societal groups intolerant attitudes are directed, but especially to identify its 
underlying mechanisms. Thus far, intolerance has not had major destabilizing effects, and 
understanding the underlying mechanisms may keep it that way. The role of the internet in 
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creating or supplementing social capital is one of the most pressing matters for political 
science research. Digitalization is a global process that is changing societies across the 
globe in unprecedented rates. Studying the consequences of internet usage at the level of 
the individual is going to allow us to chart and anticipate societal change and comprehend 
the changing ways in which people are tied to each other and the state, which is what helps 
democracies thrive.  
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY ITEMS (DUTCH ORIGINAL) 
I. Control variables 
A. Wat is uw geslacht? [0 = female, 1 = male] 
B. Wat is uw geboortejaar? [1912-2000] 
C. Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding? [1 to 8 = high level education] 
1. Basisschool 
2. VMBO/MAVO 
3. HAVO 
4. VWO 
5. MBO 
6. HBO 
7. WO 
8. Postdoctoraal 
D. Hoe hoog is uw bruto inkomen? [0 to 4 = high income] 
1. Ik heb geen inkomen 
2. Minder dan €1450 per maand 
3. Tussen €1450 en €2500 per maand 
4. Tussen €2500 en €5000 per maand 
5. Meer dan €5000 per maand 
6. Ik weet het niet/geen opgaaf 
 
II. Political tolerance [0 to 6 = high tolerance] 
A. Sommige mensen vinden van bepaalde groepen een dreiging uitgaan voor de samenleving. Welke 
groep in de samenleving vindt u het minst sympathiek? 
1. Neonazi’s 
2. Oost-Europese immigranten 
3. Moslimfundamentalisten 
4. Homoseksuelen 
5. Anders: 
B. Vindt u dat mensen die behoren tot uw gekozen groep… 
1. les mogen geven aan uw kinderen? [ja = 1, nee = 0] 
2. zich verkiesbaar mogen stellen? 
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3. een politieke partij mogen oprichten? 
4. zendtijd mogen krijgen bij een publieke omroep? 
5. een demonstratie of betoging mogen houden? 
6. onder toezicht geplaatst moeten worden? 
 
III. Association membership [0 to 20 = high number] 
Van welke van de volgende organisaties en verenigingen bent u lid? 
1. Jeugdvereniging 
2. Religieuze vereniging 
3. Politieke partij of –organisatie 
4. Natuur- of milieuvereniging 
5. Consumentenvereniging 
6. Culturele vereniging 
7. Hobbyvereniging 
8. Vakbond 
9. Patiëntenvereniging 
10. Omroeporganisatie 
11. Sportvereniging 
12. Vrouwenvereniging 
13. Wijkvereniging 
14. Fanclub of supportersvereniging 
15. Bejaarden- of seniorenvereniging 
16. Carnavals- of Oranjevereniging 
17. Studenten- of studievereniging 
18. Beroepsvereniging 
19. Muziekvereniging 
20. Anders:  
 
IV. Online activity 
Hoe vaak houdt u zich bezig met elk van de volgende online activiteiten? [1 = nagenoeg elke dag, 2 = 1 
of 2 keer per week, 3 = 1 of 2 keer per maand, 4 = zelden of nooit, 5 = weet niet]. 
1. E-mailen 
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2. Contacten onderhouden via sociale netwerksites (Facebook, Hyves, LinkedIn) 
3. Meepraten op discussiefora 
4. Informatie zoeken 
5. Foto’s en video’s bekijken en delen (Flickr, YouTube) 
6. Nieuws en actualiteiten volgen 
7. Bijdragen aan kennisvraagstukken (crowdsourcing) 
8. Financieel bijdragen aan een project of organisatie (crowdfunding) 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY ITEMS (ENGLISH) 
I. Control variables 
A. Geslacht [0 = male, 1 = female] 
B. What is your year of birth? [1912-2000] 
C. What is the highest level of education you have completed? [1  – 8 = high level of education]  
1. Primary school 
2. VMBO/MAVO 
3. HAVO 
4. VWO 
5. MBO 
6. HBO 
7. WO 
8. PhD 
D. What is your gross income? [0 = none, 4 = high] 
1. I have no income 
2. Less than €1450 a month 
3. Between €1450 and €2500 a month 
4. Between €2500 and €5000 a month 
5. More than €5000 a month 
6. I don’t know / I do not want to share this information 
 
II. Political tolerance [0 to 6 = high tolerance] 
A. Some people believe that certain groups pose a threat to social order. Which of the following groups 
would you designate as your least liked group? 
1. Neo-nazis 
2. East European immigrants 
3. Muslim fundamentalists 
4. Homosexuals 
5. Other 
B. Do you think people belonging to your least liked group should be allowed to …  
1. teach your children? [yes = 1, no = 0] 
2. seek office? [yes = 1, no = 0] 
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3. found a political party? [yes = 1, no = 0] 
4. have airtime on public broadcasting? [yes = 1, no = 0] 
5. hold a rally or demonstration? [yes = 1, no = 0] 
6. be put under surveillance? [yes = 0, no = 1] 
 
III. Association membership [0 = none; 20 = high number] 
Of which of the following types of associations and organizations are you a member? 
1. Youth association 
2. Religious association 
3. Political party or organization 
4. Environmental organization or nature association 
5. Consumer organization 
6. Cultural association 
7. Hobby association 
8. Trade union 
9. Patient organization 
10. Broadcasting association 
11. Sports association 
12. Womens organization 
13. Community organization 
14. Fan or supporters club 
15. Seniors association 
16. Carnival or ‘Oranje’ association 
17. Student association 
18. Business or professional association 
19. Music association  
20. Other  
 
IV. Online activity 
How often do you engage in each of the following online activities?  
[1 = practically every day, 2 = once or twice a week, 3 = once or twice a month, 4 = rarely or never, 5 = 
don’t know]. 
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1. Reading and sending e-mail 
2. Social networking (Facebook, Hyves, LinkedIn) 
3. Contribute to a forum discussion 
4. Search for information 
5. Watch and share photos and videos (Flickr, YouTube) 
6. Keeping up with news and current affairs 
7. Help solve another person’s or organization’s problem (crowdsourcing) 
8. Make a financial donation to a project or organization (crowdfunding) 
 
 
